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Introduction 
If it is the case that culture has become the recognised site for the legitimisation of 
religious identity in France today, why have a number of thinkers turned to the 
philosophy of religion in response and in resistance (Agamben, 2004; Debray, 1997, 
2001; Lacoste, 1994; Levinas, 2000; Ricoeur, 1998; Žižek, 2000, 2003)? What is it in and 
against philosophy per se that motivates this turn? Taking Alain Badiou's Saint Paul: la 
fondation de l’universalisme (1997) and Jean-François Lyotard's La Confession Augustin 
(1998), this article demonstrates the potential of philosophy as antiphilosophy to 
radicalise religious culture, eschewing religion as cultural experience and rethinking it 
outside the parameters of historicism and sophistry (Badiou, 2009). My aim is to explore 
in philosophy a lexicon of legitimisation that invites us to reinvent how we think 
knowledge, subjectivity, fidelity and truth-value through an antiphilosophical act, the 
central category of which is truth as both a void and thus a new way of thinking. Badiou 
establishes antiphilosophy as a forgetting of the history of philosophy through the 
affirmation of the void. I will discuss the implications of this position as he resets 
subjectivity and the event outside their historical and metaphysical legacies. In the second 
part of this article, I examine how Lyotard continues the anitphilosophical act through the 
poetic composition of La Confession. Drawing specifically on Stéphane Mallarmé’s 
concept of elimination in Un coup de dés n’abolira jamais le hasard, I argue that Lyotard 
achieves a purity of (non) thought through poetry’s capacity to erase the logic of 
signification described in the relation between word and object. 
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From non-philosophy to antiphilosophy  
Badiou’s antiphilosophy, one could argue, has a precedent in the non-philosophy of 
Deleuze and Guattari (2005). Non-philosophy is a useful first sighter in situating Alain 
Badiou’s understanding of Saint Paul along a plane of immanence that views a life of the 
mind outside the features we associate with the self – consciousness, memory and 
identity. Badiou, to be clear, is not an empiricist. His ontology is more mathematical, 
hence his interest in Paul as founded more on the latter's infinity of pure thought. 
However, what we may be able to take forward from Deleuze’s transcendental 
empiricism in the context of Badiou’s Paul are the processes of singularisation than run 
underneath social wholes and the idea that empiricism is an act of thinking prior to the 
world of the subject and object. 
Badiou views Paul first and foremost as a human being and a free thinker 
untethered to a subjectivity, identity or social group. Paul’s thought is not filtered via self 
or category but rendered pure (‘sensed’ by its conviction, determined by its immanence). 
‘Paul’ is thus defined by his embodiment of pure thought. In this, he occupies a 
transcendental field in that his thought is not directly related to a previous experience nor 
does it belong to a subject: ‘Aussi se présente-t-il comme pur courant de conscience a-
subjectif, conscience pré-réflexive impersonnelle, durée qualitative de la conscience sans 
moi’ (Deleuze, 1995: 4). For Badiou, the purity of this thought is its practice (‘pensée-
pratique’), a variation on Deleuze’s image of thought.  
The Deleuzian context is also instructive as non-philosophy. In Qu’est-que la 
philosophie? (2005) Deleuze and Guattari highlight what philosophy is not. It is not 
reflection and communication, nor is it the four ‘illusions’ of transcendence, universals, 
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externals and discursiveness. It is not the inheritance of concepts nor is it causality and its 
affective chain of relations and associations. They point however to one essential feature 
of philosophy; its non-philosophical plane of immanence. The plane of immanence is the 
abstract, absolute milieu where ‘concepts’ are held together before their expression. This 
plane of immanence is prephilosophical (non-philosophical) in that it is a plane without 
space for subject or object and where what matters is thought itself and its infinity. The 
plane of immanence as a non-philosophical image of how thought is resonates with how 
Badiou thinks infinite thought. Deleuze’s turn away from metaphysics to the plane of 
immanence and pure thought gestures in the direction of Badiou’s antiphilosophy as a 
pure thought practice. In thought-practice, Badiou moves away from a systematic 
approach to philosophy underpinned by dialectics and rational argument to its practice in 
immanence in which the value of an event is measured only in and of itself and not in 
external (religious or cultural) capital.  
One of the problems with philosophy today, according to Badiou, is that it has lost 
its relevance to contemporaneity. Thus, in his preface to L’antiphilosophie de 
Wittgenstein (2009), Badiou states that one of the conditions of philosophy is that the 
truths to which it bears witness must always be ‘contemporaines’ (Badiou, 2009: 7). He 
suggests that we listen to the ‘figure’ of the antiphilosopher for guidance on this. 
Antiphilosophy1 is founded in a ‘malaise’ that has afflicted and continues to afflict 
philosophy today (Badiou, 1992: 57). Symptoms of this malaise can be located in 
historicism and an unhealthy reliance on hermeneutic, analytic and postmodern traditions 
(Badiou, 1999) and in sophistry and the effects of discourse. Badiou proposes a violent 
break (forgetting) of the history of philosophy and a turn away from what he calls the 
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language games of sophistry (Badiou, 1992: 59-62). In their place, he proclaims truth(s) 
as the central category of any possible philosophy: ‘La philosophie est la suscitation, sous 
la catégorie de Vérité, d’un vide […]. Elle construit un appraeil de saisie des vérités, ce 
qui veut dire: énoncer qu’il y en a, et se laisser saisir par cet “il y a”’(69). The possibility 
of truth, albeit a void, enables antiphilosophy to appear as an opening of eternity without 
God or soul. To aver the existence of a truth (in reaction to sophistry that produces an 
empty concept of truth) is an antiphilosophical act (Bosteels, 2011: 28) because it is 
without precedent or guarantee, and only has itself and its effects to attest to its value 
(29). It is an act of ‘singularité existentielle’ (28) in which the antiphilosopher speaks2 in 
his proper name, as this is the only proof of what he is saying. This speech act is the 
antiphilosopher’s only certainty. As a singular speech act, antiphilosophy goes against 
philosophy as historical (successive) thought and announces itself as (non-) thought that 
can ‘touch’ (sense) the real (79). (Non-) thought, as we will see, becomes a way of 
challenging philosophy’s ‘Je-cratie’ (Badiou, 2009: 80) through the subject, the event and 
nomination. 
 
Badiou’s Paul: subject, event, universal singularity 
Badiou’s interest in Paul is as a thinker and a doer, not as a subject. Paul the disciple is 
replaced by Paul the body. Badiou’s Paul is born of decisions that happen to him over the 
course of time and which he cannot avoid. This transformation of Paul is singular in its 
conviction and universal in its singularity. Conviction and singularity are renewed with 
every new event, each time reconstituting Paul as a thinker/doer. The relevance of Paul to 
Badiou’s theory of the subject is defined by the way Paul subordinates his existence to 
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the aleatory dimension of the event of the resurrection.3 More broadly, Badiou’s ‘théorie’ 
of the subject cannot be theorised as an identity or the production of reflection. It is in 
this key way that Badiou’s subject is framed outside history, religion and culture. Let me 
turn to some related observations on Badiou’s concept of the event. An event is declared. 
It does not owe its truth to history or to miracle. The truth of an event emerges out of the 
void as an act of conviction. Truth is therefore evental, which is to say that it has no 
structure or law to account for it. Paul’s declaration of truth has value as a ‘rupture active 
salvatrice’ only in its naming (Badiou, 2009: 29). In other words, its value is immanent to 
the declaration itself as an antiphilosophical act and not according to historical, religious 
or cultural contexts: ‘Car être sauvé n’est rien d’autre que le surgissement de l’acte’ (85). 
Badiou replaces the cultural and religious content of the act with Paul’s purification by 
the act and his capacity to ‘porter (pas comprendre, ou savoir, ou penser, mais porter)’ 
the conviction of the act itself (86). One of the consequences of this relationship between 
event and truth is that the object of a subject’s subordination (in this case, truth) is not 
defined as an end-point or a concept.4 Truth is a procedure within a void. 
 
‘Not in My Name’: antiphilosophical speech act 
As the subtitle of Badiou’s work confirms, Paul is the foundation of universalism. This 
foundation is built on his subjective subordination. The singularity of his universalism is 
also non-structural in that it happens outside state, market or public influence. Badiou is 
as scathing of secularism’s republican integrationist dogma as he is of communitarianism 
itself (‘Nous avons affaire à un processus de pétainisation rampante de l’État’ (Badiou, 
1997: 10). What is of interest, I would argue, in Badiou's representation of Paul as our 
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contemporary of a universal singularity is the way he (the purity of his ‘thought’) 
supersedes the temporality of socio-cultural structures. The singularity of Paul’s a-
subjectivity – and his universal contemporaneity – are embodied in his erasure and 
forgetting of cultural and religious allegiances through the antiphilosophical act of his 
(non-) thought.  
The phrase ‘Not in My Name’ (‘Pas en/à mon nom’)5 has been widely used in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks to denounce violence carried out in the name of religion. On 
the one hand, ‘Not in My Name’ is a phrase that is born out of extreme violence, 
reinforced by religious and cultural politics in which religious groups perceive 
themselves to be alienated. On the other hand, the phrase holds fast to an aspiration to 
some higher ideal beyond cultural difference. ‘Not in My Name’ carries critical purchase 
because the particularity of the locution ‘My Name’ is a subjective means of 
disidentifying with the symbolism of cultural relativism, and creating a different meaning 
to subjectivity (its a-subjectivity) that gestures to the universal. Ironically and critically, 
the locution also points to a greater and universal value that the particular can play 
through disidentification with the universal. The emergence of the phrase ‘Je suis 
Charlie’, including its variants ‘Je suis Paris’ and ‘Je suis musulman’, play on this 
declarative universal potential of the particular. Combined, they point to Badiou’s 
argument on universalism as founded on two conditions. In the first, Badiou’s subject 
emerges as a universal subject out of his declarative singularity and fidelity to the event. 
Paul, he claims, orients ‘une pensée à l’universel dans sa singularité surgissante’ (38). 
Singularity therefore in its very subjective disposition points outwards: ‘C’est le “pour 
tous” qui fait que je suis compté pour un […]; le Un n’est pas accessible sans le “pour 
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tous”’ (103).6 The second condition is the claim to be able to construct a universalism out 
of a (Christ-) event that has no historical veracity. However, the positive originality of 
this condition for Badiou is that Paul takes his consciousness of truth from the purity of 
the event ‘détaché de toute assignation objectiviste aux lois particulières d’un monde ou 
d’une société’ (115). In both conditions, it is the primacy of subjective and singular truth 
which determines, over and above any societal, political or cultural allegiance, the 
universalism of truth in an operational void.  
‘My Name’ (and ‘Je suis Charlie’) therefore can mean something other than 
cultural or religious identification. They are antiphilosophical speech acts that bear 
witness to the universalisation of the particular as a way of wresting power away from 
religious and cultural relativism.7 They are acts that validate the particular outside the 
cultural. Badiou’s particular is reconfigured outside the structures of identity, gender and 
object determination. The antiphilosophical act is not to be found in an ‘I’ (‘l'Un’) but in 
a connective, transmissive and multiple ‘Deux.’8 This is the essence of Badiou’s 
universal singularity – the capacity to experience the world beyond the self: ‘avec comme 
point de départ, une chose qui, réduite à elle-même, n’est qu’une rencontre, presque rien, 
on apprend qu’on peut expérimenter le monde à partir de la différence et non pas 
seulement de l’identité’ (22). Badiou's rediscovered ‘joie’ in Paul is therefore pluralistic 
yet rooted in the fact that one does not have to resort to the cultural for the legitimisation 
of belief. On the contrary, culture’s ‘sponsors’ of law and morality are replaced by 
antiphilosophy's insistence on the infinity of a transcendent which is not located in any 
point of origin but in the persistent conviction of thought itself: ‘Soyez transformés par le 
renouvellement de votre pensée’, exhorts Badiou (118). In his opening chapter ‘La 
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Contemporanéité de Paul’, Badiou uses the example of Paul as a universal free thinker to 
preserve this persistence of free (non-) thought from the debasement of an ideology of 
culture founded on monetarist abstraction and democracy.9 Whilst Slavoj Žižek is more 
direct in his naming of culture as anathema to authentic religious experience,10 culture for 
Badiou is associated indirectly with a number of negative phenomena, including the 
present (‘Ne vous conformez pas au présent siècle’ (18); the law, which he equates with 
‘morale’; and with ‘oeuvres’ by which he means achievements, work, practical life. 
Resistance to the temporality and transitoriness of cultural production is imperative for 
Badiou in his persistence of truth as a universal singularity.11 Truth in this sense remains 
extrinsic to axiom. What is at stake in Paul therefore for Badiou and according to scholars 
(Watkins, 2011: 58; Hallward, 2002; 2003) is the potential to think and preserve the 
eternal truth-value of belief as a thought procedure over and outside time, and to 
disconnect with belief as praxis and ‘life-world category.’12 
 ‘Not in My Name’ also attests to the value of nomination/naming in the truth 
procedure of an event. For an event to be a valid antiphilosophical act, someone must 
recognise and name the event as an event – make it ‘proper’ to them. For Badiou, to 
name an event is to underscore the positive, disruptive abnormality of the event as an 
historical intervention. The events of CharlieHebdo and Paris/Bruxelles (2015/16) may 
be attributable to the name of ‘ISIL’ but that in itself does not validate them as ‘events.’ 
In his work on the death of communism D’un désastre obscur (1998), Badiou clarifies 
our thinking on the validity of events. He claims that transformation of a situation is not 
enough to signify that the grace of an event has occurred; nor is it the case that everything 
changes in an event. He states: ‘S’il n’y a pas d’événement, c’est que c’est de l’histoire 
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des États qu’il s’agit, et nullement de l’histoire de la politique. Cette distinction est 
capitale’ (Badiou, 1998: 20-21). It is the event itself, and the (non-) thought as a reaction 
to historicism that it cements, wherein lies its eventiveness, not in statist, terrorist or 
propagandist projections. The Syrian refugees Pope Francis took back to Rome following 
his visit to the island of Lesbos in April 2016 could be viewed as an event in Badiou’s 
sense of the word; it is an event inspired solely by one person’s love/conviction which 
has a universal resonance. By contrast, the problem with ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant) and its terrorism is not only its coupling of statist and religious indoctrination 
but the prohibitive particularity of its terror. We have argued in the context of Saint Paul 
and in the significance of the phrase ‘Not in My Name’ and its variants, that what defines 
an event is ‘une proposition infinie, dans la forme radicale d’une singularité, et d’un 
supplément’ (11) [my emphasis]. Antiphilosophy reinforces this singularity by affixing to 
it its universal transmissibility (its supplement). Without this singular > universal 
trajectory, the singularity of the event as a departure for truth, according to Badiou, is 
invalid. Terrorist ‘acts’ fail because ‘what is at stake are bloody and nihilistic games of 
power without purpose and without truth’ (Badiou, 2014: 132). Communism, with which 
Badiou has identified politically, has also fallen short of this proposition because its 
militant, emergent subjectivity (its ‘nous’) had been appropriated by a Party machine (7-
10). Badiou writes:  
 
Si la subjectivité politique est devenue incapable de soutenir, par elle-même, dans 
sa pensée et dans son acte, la singularité de son trajet (et donc aussi sa connexion 
philosophique à l’éternité émancipatrice, aux invariants), alors il n’y a plus d’autre 
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référent que l’État, et il est vrai que le caractère criminel de tel ou tel État peut 
devenir un argument sans réplique. (24) 
 
Badiou encourages us to make connections between universal singularity and 
evental truths. This is particularly the case in his discourse on difference. Badiou claims 
that acknowledgment of difference breaks down cultural and identity constructions and is 
the pathway to universal singularity. By extension the post-requisite to the 
acknowledgement of difference is its transcendence: ‘On ne peut transcender les 
différences que si la bénévolence à l’égard des coutumes et des opinions se présente 
comme une indifférence intolérable aux différences’ (Badiou, 1997: 106). Respect for 
difference does not have to equate to political accommodation but can remain at the level 
of indifference (this is the essence of French universalism). Indifference therefore is not 
non-knowledge or dispassionate objectivity but can be sourced in the ‘savoir’ and 
‘pratique’ of difference. However Badiou is no republican; he acknowledges difference 
but advocates that difference be ‘traversé’ in order for a universal singularity (not a 
political universalism) to be constructed: ‘Paul […] non seulement s’interdit de 
stigmatiser les différences et les coutumes, mais entend s’y plier de telle sorte qu’à 
travers elles, en elles, passe le processus de leur disposition subjective’ (106). I would 
make two related points. The first is to highlight that Badiou sees difference as an 
opportunity to level out inequality as a matter of justice: ‘Ce que Paul entreprend […], est 
de faire passer l’égalitarisme universalisant par la reversibilité d’une règle inégalitaire’ 
(111). Difference is not a reflection of a state of permanence. It can be acted on and 
through and is subject to change. Secondly, Badiou couches universalism in a modifying 
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language of traversal. Above for instance, to universalise egalitarianism is described as a 
process of passing through difference with the capacity of being able to affect the 
particular: ‘l’universalité puisse faire retour sur les différences particularisantes’ (112). 
Badiou suggests that we can free ourselves from the yoke of particularity through the 
liberating effects of thinking universally: 
 
L’universel n’est pas la négation de la particularité […]. Toute particularité est une 
conformation, un conformisme. Il s’agit de soutenir une non-conformité à ce qui 
toujours nous conforme. La pensée est dans l’épreuve de la conformité, et seul 
l’universel la relève, dans un labeur ininterrompu, une traversée inventive, de cette 
épreuve. (118) 
 
(Non-) thought 
According to Bosteels, antiphilosophy is archipolitical and archiaesthetic (Bosteels, 2011: 
38). In other words, (non-) thought is more radically political and aesthetic than existing 
politics and art because the purity of the thought procedure operates in a void divested of 
socio-cultural signification. This void raises beings into non beings and truths into 
mythological truths. Paul is not ‘Paul’ but the ‘théoricien antiphilosophique de 
l’universalité’ (Badiou, 1998: 116). The void is the plane on which the event is played 
out as a truth procedure (not a reality) and where universal singularity is a thought (not an 
object). In the same way, Badiou’s discussion of the subject is that of a thought 
disposition not an identity. To criticise his theory of universal singularity on the basis of 
its lack of real effects (what he calls disparagingly the effective truths of cultural politics) 
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would be to misread Badiou’s antiphilosophy and his wider critique of religious belief. If, 
as he argues, law is synonymous with culture, then salvation from the law can only be 
sustained (and for Badiou justified) in the persistence of thought itself. Paul’s persistence 
of thought radicalises belief through faith (which saves one from the malediction of the 
law); through Christ (the end of the law); and through love (the beginning of a new non-
literal law). 
This radical (non-) thought is ‘named’ not in the figure of the ‘Son’ (or disciple) but 
in the apostle. Badiou aligns philosophy and its cultivation of disciples alongside 
Christian discourse founded in the generation of Sons. The authority of philosophy as 
historical knowledge to which the disciple is in awe defines this relationship as one of 
subservience and inequality. The apostle on the other hand is a witness. His knowledge is 
not grounded in philosophical logos and its call to ‘s’imaginer connaître, quand c’est des 
possibilitées subjectives qu’il s’agit’ (48). Subjective possibilities are what Paul’s 
conviction to the Christ-event creates; apostles as reborn ‘sons’ of the event (apostles of 
antiphilosophy) who supersede the Father, knowledge and philosophical logos: ‘L’apôtre 
[…] connaît le sens univoque de ce qui va venir’ (48). The apostle as ‘son’ enshrines 
filiative (subjective) equality and carries in him the abolition of hierarchy and power. 
Badiou intensifies this antiphilosophical direction in his radicalisation of faith, Christ, 
hope and grace. I will end this first part by referring to grace. Having argued that as  
‘théoricien antiphilosophique de l’universalité’ and ‘antiphilosophe de génie’ Paul 
disarms philosophy through his eventiveness, Badiou underpins his antiphilosophy 
through grace, defined as ‘événementiel’ – a happening of unfathomable power 
(‘surabondance insensée’ (85)) and as a Law (not a law). Endowing grace with the power 
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of a Law that is non-legal but whose legitimacy is organically bound to the unpredictive 
universality of the event, Badiou traverses the cultural, political and legal foundations of 
law in order to re-legitimise the truth of the event in a lexicon that has the authority to 
surpass the law in its affirmation of a Law (of grace) with universal relevance: 
‘L’événement seul, comme contingence illégale, fait advenir une multiplicité en excès sur 
elle-même, et donc la possibilité d’outrepasser la finitude’ (85). The process at work here 
is the same process of traversal that Badiou deploys in his discussion on particularity / 
difference; the universal that traverses the particular is only possible because of the 
organic and excessive Law of truth that emerges from the subject’s declarative fidelity to 
the event. This is enough for Badiou to sublate difference (including the law of the land). 
If the law of particularity is derived from the logic of rights and duty, the Law of grace is 
legitimised by its potential happening to everyone without reason: ‘La grâce est le 
contraire de la loi pour autant qu’elle est ce qui vient sans être dû’(80-81). Grace is 
therefore radicalised in Badiou’s antiphilosophy in a legally non-legal way where the law 
of finitude is trespassed by the Law of grace. In this, Badiou is faithful to the writings of 
Saint Paul who wrote: ‘Let me put it another way. The law was our guardian until Christ 
came; it protected us until we could be made right with God through faith’ (Saint Paul, 
Galatians 3:24). 
 
Poetic composition as antiphilosophy 
Badiou is not averse to taking a swipe at some of his contemporaries (Badiou, 1989: 7-
12). Jean-François Lyotard, a particular target of his opprobrium, is disparaged for his 
philosophy of ‘ruines’ and immodesty in announcing the end of grand narratives. Badiou 
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uses the work of Lyotard (and Lacoue-Labarthe) to exemplify modern philosophy’s 
preoccupation with historicism. The argument against historicism serves to distance 
Badiou’s antiphilosophy from his contemporaries. It also, I would suggest, disguises 
some points of convergence. Badiou and Lyotard are philosophers of rupture – consider 
Badiou’s break with philosophy’s ‘déconstruction de son passé et l’attente vide de son 
avenir’ (Badiou, 1992: 58) and Lyotard’s distrust of metanarrative and its hegemonic 
discourse (see Deguy, 2001: 97). It is along the line of rupture that I propose to make a 
case for Lyotard’s La Confession d’Augustin (1998) as antiphilosophy. In breaking with 
conventions of presentation and discourse, La Confession is an antiphilosophical act in 
one distinct way highlighted by Badiou in L’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein: 
antiphilosophy is best conveyed as poetic composition. 
 Across much of his oeuvre, Badiou makes reference to the symbolist poet 
Stéphane Mallarmé, whose poetry, he claims, is an example of antiphilosophy (Badiou, 
1989: 49-58; Badiou, 1992: 108-129; Badiou, 2009: 53-55; Badiou, 2014: 33). 
Mallarmé’s poetry plays to Badiou’s idea of the purity of thought, the multiplicity of 
operations in which the subject is annulled and where truth is framed not by knowledge 
but by ‘le néant’ (Badiou, 1992: 108-129). At the end of L’antiphilosophie de 
Wittgenstein, Badiou writes: ‘Je pense que j’ai résumé mon attitude à l’égard de la 
philosophie lorsque j’ai dit: la philosophie devrait être écrite comme une composition 
poétique’ (Badiou, 2009: 110). In the same way Badiou views philosophy as a turn 
towards ‘itself’ (‘Le (re)tour de la philosophie elle-même’ (Badiou, 1992: 57-78)), poetry 
is seen as a hermetically-sealed structure (‘un assemblage’) that stands alone and outside 
history. For Badiou, poetic language functions for itself as its own linguistic activity and 
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its own proof of power. It installs its own truth. It is the apogée of anti-communication in 
that readers get to hear and see what language does not communicate: ‘la poésie fait que 
la langue dit ce qu’elle ne dit pas, ou montre matériellement le non-dit de son dire. Le 
lieu de l’acte est alors convoqué au bord des équivoques de la langue, comme ressource 
non dite de la puissance entière de celle-ci’ (Badiou, 2009: 110). Poetry fits Badiou’s idea 
of the purity of philosophy as ‘elle-même’ and as transversal.13 Lyotard has written 
extensively on literature and poetry, in particular Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants 
(1988); Signé Malraux (1996); Chambre sourde (1998a); Discours, Figure (2002). A 
common theme running through his analysis of poetic language is its capacity to undo 
meaning and return to the transgressive power of the word. As the literature of non-
communication, poetry enables the word to lose its arbitrariness for the thing it is 
supposed to designate. In this procedure, poetry distances itself from the ‘politique de la 
prose’ and engages with ‘sens’ (not signification) as the site of freedom (Lyotard, 1991: 
101). Lyotard describes this engagement as one in which the writer ‘entre en résonance 
avec la phrase’ (104). 
By way of a preface to our analysis of La Confession, it may be helpful to situate 
this view of poetic composition in relation to Lyotard’s concept of the différend. In Le 
Différend Lyotard uses the expression ‘un régime de phrases’ (Lyotard, 1983: 10) to 
highlight the grip of presupposition and meaning on the phrase and phrases. He argues 
that a phrase is defined as articulate in the way it presents a ‘univers’; a phrase is 
inarticulate when it does not present a universe, when it does not speak of anything but 
says without articulating that there is something (22). The différend is between the 
articulate and the inarticulate: ‘c’est l’état instable et l’instant du langage où quelque 
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chose qui doit pouvoir être mis en phrases ne peut pas l’être encore’ (29). The différend is 
the contingency at the heart of this linkage and the source of conflict. The significance of 
the différend for literature generally is that narratives (including metanarratives) are 
places where the différend gets neutralised, which is why, as a non-narrative, poetic 
composition confronts and disrupts the regime of the phrase in relation to causality, 
continuity and logic  (Lyotard, 2002: 62-63). I want to explore Lyotard’s différend as the 
place of an antiphilsophical act in the following ways. First, the différend resists 
philosophy’s metaphysical fundamentalism as Idea (Boeve, 2011: 274) in its emphasis on 
the phrase as occurrence (quod) rather than its determination (quid). Second, poetry is an 
idiom14 for the liberation of the différend through the abolition of signification as value: 
‘Il faut beaucoup chercher pour trouver les nouvelles règles de formation et 
d’enchaînement de phrases capables d’exprimer le différend que trahit le sentiment si 
l’on ne veut pas que ce différend soit aussitôt étouffé en un litige et que l’alerte donnée 
par le sentiment ait été inutile’ (Lyotard, 1983: 29). Third, the affective language of 
poetry reinforces resistance to and liberation from the phrase by its direct appeal to the 
body and senses. 
 
Poem as différend 
La Confession (melos, poem, psalm) is written as an autobiography with two persons 
playing critical roles: a confessor (for whom confession is the modern subject ‘on safe 
ground, in the sense of  being self-determining or self-sufficient’ (Curtis, 2003: 199)15), 
and an ‘homme intérieur’ (or ‘ipse’) for whom self-autonomy and self-authority have 
been deferred to the immanent power of the event itself, but who is a counter to the 
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presumption of the confessor. Designated clearly as an event (‘Un écho avant-coureur 
[…] a devancé l’événement’ (Lyotard 1998: 21)), Lyotard introduces Augustine’s 
visitation (event) to him/us outside history, space and time. It is both ‘rencontre et ne l’est 
pas. Comme la transe ne finit pas, elle n’a pas commencé […]; où la situer, la mettre en 
relation, dans une biographie? La relater?’ (21-22). The arrival is impossible to articulate. 
The early pages of La Confession bear witness to the search for an adequation between 
event and its articulation. The différend to emerge from this search is highlighted in a 
definition of the self, particularly in our understanding of the ‘homme intérieur.’ Michel 
Deguy’s analysis is helpful here. Deguy defines Lyotard’s idea of the self between inside 
and outside, in which the inside (the psychological) gives way to the outside (the real, the 
world) (Deguy, 2001: 95-96). To turn inwards to the ‘I’ (confessor, cogito) is to process 
the event by ciphering experience through consciousness and memory: ‘And who would 
ever dream of reopening this inside – interior intimo meo? That’s known as nihilism’ 
(96). For Deguy, the real transformation of the self takes place outside (that is, the inside 
in relation to the outside). Lyotard says of the ‘homme intérieur’:  
 
Non pas le souvenir donc, mais ledit  
homme intérieur, qui n’est pas homme et pas  
intérieur, femme et homme, un dehors au  
dedans, tel est le seul témoin de la présence  
de l’Autre, de l’autre de la présence. (Lyotard, 1998: 23)  
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‘L’homme interieur’, as outside inside, embodies the relationality of the outside to the 
inside. Deguy sums this up perfectly: ‘[It is] not that the self is inside, but inside the self 
there is a man’ (Deguy, 2001: 96). For Lyotard, the man is the body: 
 
                            […] L’homme intérieur  
ne témoigne pas d’un fait, d’un événement 
violent qu’il aurait vu, qu’il aurait entendu, 
savouré ou touché. Il ne porte pas témoignage, 
il est le témoignage. Il est la vision, le  
flair, l’écoute, le goût, le contact violés  
et métamorphosés […].  
L’homme intérieur n’évoque pas une  
absence. Il n’est pas là pour l’autre, il est  
l’Autre du là, qui est là, là où la lumière a  
lieu sans lieu, où le son résonne sans durée. (Lyotard, 1998: 23-4) 
 
The inner human does not do things. She is things. She is the sponge of 
sensoriality. The experience of the event is felt as a cut to which there is no witness 
because the cut occurs in ‘un espace-temps à n-dimensions’ (27). Invisible, its effects are 
felt underneath the flesh: ‘Telle serait la chair visitée, compénétrée par ton espace-temps, 
confondue et confuse de ce coup, mais confite d’infinité, imprégnée et prégnante de ta 
liqueur surabondante’ (28). ‘Lyotard’s’ standpoint at the crossroads between confessor 
and ‘homme intérieur’ (between Augustine’s Confessions and his own Confession) places 
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him between the articulate and the inarticulate. The ‘I’ is the time of the articulate for the 
confessor. However it is writing post-event – as reflection. The différend of the 
inarticulate is exposed in the idiom of poetic composition, captured in the following 
example where the hyphen (‘le travail du trait […] la silhouette du casseur’ (Lyotard, 
2002: 303)) is the graphic place where communication breakdown is threatened and 
rescued by poetic continuity, and where linguistic deferral repeats the deferral between 
desire and its object: 
 
Ce n’est pas de l’esprit même, comme il  
est écrit, ipsius animi, que le temps s’avère la  
distentio triplice, mais, dans l’esprit du désir  
portant trois fois le deuil de sa chose. L’at- 
tend-il, expectat, elle se prépose, et se propose  
à venir; qu’il cherche à l’appréhender, adten- 
dit, à force d’attention, elle s’expose et se sup- 
pose au présent; se la donne-t-il à retenir,  
meminit, elle se dépose et se repose en passé. (Lyotard, 1998: 52) 
 
Here the ‘I’ will never have what it desires. It lives on deferred time, not in the time of its 
object: ‘il temporise’ (53). The hyphen highlights this deferral. It is also a poetic moment 
of respiration in which Lyotard breaks the historicism and dogmatism of the phrase/word: 
‘où on revient sur soi, où les résonances sont écoutées et libérées […]. C’est une “stase” 
(Lyotard, 1991: 104). Lyotard takes linguistic pleasure in undermining the mind’s (‘I’) 
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arrogance as he maps its efforts to outdo time in capturing the object of its various 
expectations. Italicisations accentuate this relapse. What to make of this missed 
coincidence between ‘rencontre’ and ‘acte’? On one level, it is a function of prose 
writing. Writing, from Lyotard’s perspective, is a space defined by what is/has past; 
where getting up to speed with the present (coinciding event and the act of writing) is a 
belated act of retrieval (Muresan, 2004). The hegemony of prose writing – its regimes of 
‘démocratie’ and ‘pro-jet’, ‘pro-gramme’ and ‘pro-spective’ (Lyotard, 2014: 35) – has 
shaped Lyotard’s philosophical and intellectual work. This translates in La Confession 
into the confessor’s ‘dead act’ of writing (up) his confession: ‘la confession s’écrit 
posthume en quête de l’anthume’ (Lyotard, 1998: 48). On another level, the legitimacy of 
the written confession as testament is undermined by the temporal intrigue opened up by 
its staging in a poetic format. Here, Lyotard’s response (La Confession) to Augustine’s 
Confessions is conveyed as an oral confession – a vomitorium16 of authenticity in which 
the immediacy of the act itself obviates any negotiation with language (‘la terreur du 
mot’). As we will see in the final part of this article, Lyotard elevates oral confession to 
an act of truth in which forgiveness arrives on the spot (as in absolution).  
 
Mallarmé’s elimination 
Lyotard’s study of Mallarmé’s Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira  le hasard helps deepen 
our analysis. Lyotard’s preoccupation with Mallarmé’s poetry is textual and formal. In 
particular, he responds to Mallarmé’s deconstruction of the phrase: ‘arriver de la phrase à 
la lettre par le mot; en nous servant du signe ou de l’écriture, qui relie le mot à son sens’ 
(Lyotard, 2002: 64). Central to Lyotard’s argument is the way Mallarmé’s poem deprives 
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articulated language of its prosaic function as communication (the phrase) by cutting ties 
between word and object (what Lyotard quoting Mallarmé calls ‘élimination’) (Lyotard, 
2002: 63). This elimination takes the form of a typographical and textual re-organisation, 
opening on to the space of the sensory: ‘Par là la poésie radicale exhibe qu’il y a du 
sensible en puissance dans le sens. Où est-il logé? Pas directement dans la “matière” des 
mots […], mais dans leur arrangement’ (67-68). Quoting Mallarmé extensively, Lyotard 
expands on the process of elimination by arguing that the loss of the object is nothing 
more than the loss of the sight of the object. Its representation still remains: ‘cette 
importance du visible présent jusque dans l’espace vacant du retrait’(63). This 
transposition from sight to visibility in withdrawal passes through the register of affect: it 
is the “sensation” that preserves ‘la reminiscence de l’objet aboli’ (63). Literature, 
through its signs, offers a visible trace of this process. In this final part of La Confession 
Lyotard states that authentic confession is only possible ‘si les opera, les choses comme 
elles sont données, sont aussi des signa’ (98). In this statement, he attests to the ipseity of 
the thing in itself (confession in its orality) but he also opens up a space for the mobility 
of the thing as sign. It is an important shift in the context of the différend because it 
allows us to approach our acknowledgement of the event outside the regulatory regime of 
the phrase as causal linkage and via what the phrase/word cannot express or what is not 
immediately presentable to us but which is still visible/possible.  
‘Lyotard’, the commentator inside La Confession, proposes a challenge for mind 
and soul to find out who can get close to God. He dismisses the suggestion proposed by 
the animus (mind) that God can be conceptualised or imagined in the archive of memory 
(Watkins 2011: 58). Turning to the anima (soul), he speculates whether the anima could 
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embody the form of an angel to burst through the firmament and see God in the light of 
God. As the animus gives up on the challenge, the anima gives in. In her trance-like state, 
the anima recounts interconnecting encounters with God (via poesis, anamnesis, awe). 
Each encounter is indicative of a form of desire-object elimination in which the angel 
finds fulfilment in the loss of God as object. In each, the event of God’s visitation is 
channelled indirectly as surprise. By the same token, these forms of elimination operate 
directly through inhabitation. In Saint Augustine’s Confessions, grace (gratia 
inhabitationis) is the presence of divine will in all humanity, and this presence is 
intensified as sanctifying grace in the case of the believer. Gratia inhabitationis bears 
witness to God’s presence in mankind, as opposed to variations of the concept of grace 
that construct it through acts of charity and virtue as seen in the Summa Theologica of 
Saint Thomas Aquinas (I-II.100.2/3.4). Grace situates Augustine’s experience of the 
relationship between God and mankind as an internal divine presence – as immanence.  
If we take a closer look at the encounters themselves, inhabitation works on several 
levels. The first is sensorial. The distant formalities of ‘Toi’ and ‘Moi’ of the blazon in 
the first encounter are deconstructed by the sharing of senses between God and ‘homme 
intérieur’:  
 
[…]. Je t’ai dégusté dans ma  
bouche et je reste affamé, assoiffé. Tu m’as 
touché et j’ai brûlé d’ardeur pour ta paix. (Lyotard, 1998: 76).  
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This reciprocity is sustained sexually. The presence of God in man is signified in the 
lover maximising his lover’s ‘cinq estuaires’ over ‘cinq mois’ in a ‘quintuple férocité.’ 
Secondly, confounding consciousness and philosophical logic, it is in memory relapse 
(anamnesis – antiphilosophy) where inhabitation is valorised in the form of God’s 
intimate enshrinement inside mankind. Here, inhabitation, a synaesthesia of intoxication, 
is all-consuming with God immersing the human in his presence. In the final encounter, 
the notion of an external God is erased with God having made his shrine in mankind:  
 
  
Le voici un instant logé au plus intime.  
Les limites sont renversées, le dehors/le  
dedans, l’avant/l’après, ces niaiseries de l’esprit. (77)  
 
In this insemination of the absolute from inside mankind, Lyotard points to poetic 
composition as the place where, in no longer speaking through signification or the causal 
constraints of ‘langue’, language reveals in it the power of elimination through the 
sensory. The signified of God is experienced sensorially, ‘expressed’ in a space that is the 
object’s (God’s) (Lyotard, 2002: 64). Accordingly, our understanding of the event as an 
encounter with God is transformed into our encounter with God in ourselves.  
Lyotard describes elimination as ‘l’approfondissement de l’espacement de 
référence comme distance infranchissable qui sépare le verbe et la chose et garantit au 
premier sa portée d’idéalité’ (63). The tension of this distance is played out in the latter 
stages between the two figures of the angel and the child (infancy). The angel occupies 
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the totality of the firmament. Sharing the firmament with God is enough for the angel to 
know God. It is a knowledge that comes from immanence with God and an equality of 
presence with him, rather than from philosophy or reading. The angels have no need of 
reading because his Word does not require mediation between word and object: 
 
Les créatures angéliques n’ont nul besoin,  
comme nous, de lever le regard vers les  
énigmes d’un firmament, ni d’épeler des écri- 
tures, pour connaître ton Verbe. Car ils  
voient ta face, à jamais et, sans que le temps  
déroule ses syllabes, ils y lisent les volontés  
de ton vouloir éternel. Merveille, lecture  
admirable, sans médiation […]:  
ils ne cessent de lire et ce qu’ils lisent jamais ne passe. (Lyotard, 1998: 64) 
 
The angel encapsulates the elimination of signification. Lyotard’s use of the word 
(‘Verbe’) for God has echoes of Mallarmé’s ‘verbe’ for the divine. Mallarmé replaced the 
word ‘God’ with ‘verbe’ as divine to highlight his rejection of an anthropocentric view of 
the world in which God is seen to preside over the creation of a hierarchical human race, 
where knowledge of this world is separate and exterior to the world itself. By privileging 
the word (‘verbe’) as the source of shared knowledge and parity, Mallarmé established an 
anthropomorphism founded on the power of language to eliminate the separation of man 
and God (Stanguennec, 1992: 42-43). Lyotard gestures to this distinction in the section 
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called ‘Différend’ in La Confession, specifically the difference between ‘ipse’ and ‘I.’ 
The ‘ipse’ is ‘pure verbe en acte’ with God – a parity instigated by anthropomorphism. 
The ‘I’ calls this relation ‘dieu’ (‘appelle ça dieu parce que c’est la coutume, parce que la 
théologie est aussi oeuvre de consuétude’ (Lyotard, 1998: 56-57). The ‘ipse’ of the 
différend is the purity of the break from the protocols of thinking, explaining and naming 
what is incommensurable: 
 
[…]. Et ici le dif- 
férend est tel, entre ta vertigineuse visitation 
et la pensée, qu’il serait aussi fat que celle-ci, 
aussi faux et déceptif, d’expliquer que, non 
pas le nom de dieu, mais ça même id ipsum, 
par-dessus je, la joie folle, procède du sexuel. 
Ce qui est incommensurable, qui peut en 
prendre la mesure commune? Un savoir qui 
s’en targue, en enjambant l’abîme, l’oublie, 
et récidive. La coupure est primale. (57) 
 
Lyotard describes the sky as a book or ‘bréviaire dédié par l’auteur à l’édification 
des mortels’ (61). On the one hand the sky confirms the authorship of God as Supreme 
Being. On another, it gestures to the space of elimination (prefaced by the angels). The 
central image of Mallarmé’s Un coup de dés is a ship in rough seas against the backdrop 
of a sky at night. The disposition of the letters on the page conveys both movement of the 
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ship and the Big Bear constellation that appears at the end of the poem; form and content 
in perfect symmetry. Writing conveys this symmetry via black (word) on white (page). 
However, we know that the scene of the poem takes place at night, which invites Lyotard 
to ask this question: 
 
Le ciel nocturne, négatif du texte, donc? Pas tout à fait et pas seulement: écrire 
blanc sur noir, c’est écrire avec l’encre du hasard dans l’élément de l’absolu. 
L’absolu est la trace immuable en tant que signe, présence du verbe (le mot est de 
Mallarmé, dans les écrits sur le langage), le blanc est le sens absent. La 
constellation, c’est “l’infini fixé”, le blanc de l’indéfini capté dans le signe. 
Seulement ce signe n’est pas un livre, c’est une forme: ni ombre, ni blanc, les deux. 
Et c’est en ce sens que c’est un lieu. (Lyotard, 2002: 65) 
 
Lyotard’s response challenges powers of representation and meaning – how can a night 
sky and the appearance of a white constellation be represented by writing black on white? 
It cannot but we can imagine it. It is the power to visualise this scene as an image of the 
writing process that is of interest. We can imagine that writing is a practice fraught with 
uncertainty (writing in the dark, so to speak), with whiteness indicative of an absence (in 
waiting) of signification. The constellation that appears, and can only appear in its 
totality, at the end of Un coup de dés bears witness not to the absence of meaning or 
writing in the dark but both. For Mallarmé and Lyotard, poetry is the place (‘lieu’) for 
this mutual abolition; the place where ‘rien n’a eu lieu que le lieu’ (65).  
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Unlike the angels who ‘lisent l’immuable de façon immuable’ (Lyotard, 1998: 65), 
human thought is viewed through the lens of infancy.17 Infancy is an important concept 
for Lyotard (Lyotard 1985; 1991). It has been described as an ‘integral part of his legacy’ 
(Fynsk, 2001: 47). The ambiguously entitled Lectures d’enfance (1991) does not refer to 
what Lyotard read as a child. The work is better understood as Lyotard writing from an 
infancy and to an infancy that is prior to thought; the infancy of thought, of an encounter, 
of an event, and the value of this infancy as initiation into something else (Lyotard, 
1988). This space prior to thought is also described as a body – not the body of the child 
but the body of an unconscious space that remains after it has been ‘claimed’ by language 
and the ego. Infancy is therefore limitation and (fore) sight. Infancy obscures (fore) sight 
because once thought comes it is processed ‘à la manière d’enchaînements discursifs 
linéraires’ (Lyotard, 1998: 63). Infancy is supposed to lead to the ‘vrai livre […], le livre 
de vérité face à face et tout d’un coup’ (63). But it stalls in a purgatory, ‘chassés du 
paradis de ton intimité’ (63). However Lyotard offers consolation for infancy in the final 
pages aptly entitled ‘Crayon.’ Infancy returns in the exchange between the woman from 
Ascoli and the priest in the confessional box. The woman’s belief in the power of 
absolution is so strong that even before the sacrament is imparted she ‘knows’ her sins 
have been absolved: ‘Si Dieu pardonne, elle l’entendra avant que pénitence accomplie. 
Dieu ne lambinera pas, elle en est sûre. Il reconnaît la vérité où elle décape d’un trait les 
dépôts de silence’ (119) [my emphasis]. Running afterwards to the piazza on the hill, her 
forgiveness is captured in the metonymy of the landscape as child: ‘Une enfant lisse est 
ce paysage qui commence et n’a jamais péché. Rien n’est plus saint que sa légèreté’ 
(120). Lyotard ascribes a purity to the infancy of (non-) thought, as he does also to 
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absolution as an integral part of the sacrament of penance. The priest returns to his 
private quarters after confession to write his own confession: 
 
Le saint homme s’applique ligne après ligne à tout mentionner de ce qui a déplu, il 
charge son cas, fustige sa mémoire à ne pas oublier le moindre détail […]. Son 
enfance elle-même, il requiert contre son silence et ses caprices. Il faut qu’après le 
laborieux mémoire, tout ce qu’il croit qui peut lui valoir l’indignation du seigneur 
soit consigné. (120) 
 
The différend between the woman’s confession and the priest’s is revealing. Her 
absolution is not only pure and immediate it is sensed (heard-understood) in advance. Its 
infancy is pre-scriptive. Its prescience is reinforced by the post-scriptive rituals of the 
priest’s ‘pensum’, for whom infancy is a nostalgia rather than an anticipation. Oral 
confession – the ‘alliance’ of one voice with another – breaks with the litigious 
implications of the written confession in which ‘tu dois et donc tu auras ma protection’ 
(121).  
 
Conclusion 
Badiou's Paul and Lyotard's Augustin are complementary and contrasting interventions 
on the theme of antiphilosophy. They emerge out of the crisis of the subject that steered 
the theological turn of phenomenology in the 1980s. They pursue this turn via a number 
of commonalities (particularly the ahistorical nature of the subject and the event) that 
underscore a wider and deeper antiphilosophy. In the highly charged socio-political and 
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cultural context in which religion is played out today in France, antiphilosophy offers a 
different pathway for philosophy founded on a purity of thought liberated from the 
shackles of historicism, sophistry and metaphysics.18 As a category of truth founded in a 
void, Badiou’s antiphilosophical act strips back religious belief to its pre-subjective and 
and pre-evental states where conviction to a truth does not depend on scriptural or 
cultural leverage for legitimacy, but finds its authority in the purity and persistence of 
thought in relation to the infinite. For Badiou, the way to minister this thought procedure 
is through universal singularity – not the oblation of self to the other (à la Levinas or 
Ricoeur19) but a move outwards from the narcissism of self to an engagement with 
difference in the form of ‘l'être de l'autre’ (Badiou, 2009: 24: 28). For Lyotard, 
Mallarmé’s pursuit of elimination (‘le néant’) in Un Coup de dés is the backdrop to 
Lyotard’s last and unfinished (poetic) work before his death. The pure presence of 
antiphilosophy in La Confession is sensed in the idiom of poetic composition as freedom 
from the language of communication. The poem as différend bears witness to this 
elimination. Poetry resets the default position inside the senses and the infancy of 
thought.20  
 
Notes 
1 In 1992, Badiou devoted a series of seminars to four ‘antiphilosophers’: Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Lacan 
and Saint Paul. See also his work Lacan et les philosophes (1991a). 
2 Badiou states that philosophy is not a theory but an act: ‘La philosophie (c’est-à-dire l’antiphilosophie, ou 
l’antimétaphysique, c’est la même chose) est une activité de parole non théorique’ (Badiou 2009, 109). 
3 The aleatory nature of universal singularity is central to the foundations of Paul’s universalism and to 
Badiou’s theory of love (Badiou, 2009a: 13-17). 
4 By de-objectifying the space of the subject, Badiou replaces the object as a place for truth with truth as a 
procedure through which the subject must pass: ‘A subject is that which a truth passes through’ (Badiou, 
1991: 25). The theory of a de-objectified subject for whom truth is a procedure underpins a revised 
understanding and reception of Christianity. Saint Paul does not owe his saintliness and universalism to an 
adherence to the historical biography of Christ or to a truth that could be identified in a commandment. 
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Paul’s universalism is founded in a subjective thought that declares itself in the event of the resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. In other words, Saint Paul epitomises the subject who emerges universal out of his subjective 
singularity and not out of objective determination.  
5 It is worth noting the limited use of the French language equivalent at the time of the events. 
6 Christopher Watkins explores the metaphysical implications of Badiou’s distinction between the 
multiple/infinite versus the one in Difficult Atheism (2011: 23-32). 
7 The same process can be said to be at work in the idea of ‘trending’ in which the declarative nature of the 
particular accrues a wider universal significance founded on its potential to galvanise public opinion. This 
is evident in the use of ‘Je suis Charlie.’ Even the rather whimsical variations of the ‘Je suis’ phenomenon 
(‘Je suis chien’, ‘Je suis diesel’) play on the universal (trans-species, trans-faith) possibilities that traverse 
the particular. The phrase ‘Au nom de quoi?’ (‘In Whose Name?’) – that accompanied the image of a red 
rose inserted in a bullet hole on a shattered restaurant window – reinforces this thesis. The graphic image is 
predicated on the presumption that that which is universal, no matter how incomprehensible, has a ‘name’ 
to ascribe to it, even though in this case the identity of the name is in question. All examples testify to the 
declarative potential of the particular to transcend itself and denote something else. 
8 In his treatise on love, Badiou states: ‘L’amour, ça n’est pas simplement la rencontre et les relations 
fermées entre deux individus, c’est une construction, c’est une vie de l’Un, mais du point de vue du Deux. 
Et c’est ce que j’appelle la “scène du Deux”’ (Badiou, 2009a: 33). Compare Badiou’s subjectivity in 
declaration with Debray’s formulation on transmission in which ‘l’objet de la transmission ne préexiste pas 
à l’opération de sa transmission’ (Debray, 1997: 37). 
9 The words Debray and Žižek use to contrast ‘free-thinking’ from cultural encounter is 
‘persist/persistence.’ For Debray, it forms part of a wider lexical and theoretical distinction between 
‘transmission’ and ‘communication’ in which the ‘transmission’ of Christianity is a process of  
‘prolongation’ and mediation over/through time, as opposed to ‘communication’ which ‘propagates’ 
directly through space and to superficial effect (Debray, 1997: 3-20). In a subtle critique of the culture of 
communication, in which Žižek invokes the ‘spectral’ as an agent of transmission, he writes: ‘Perhaps the 
best way of encapsulating the gist of an epoch is to focus not on the explicit features that define its social 
and ideological edifices but on the disavowed ghosts that haunt it, dwelling in a mysterious region of non-
existent entities which none the less persist, continue to exert their efficacy’ (Žižek, 2000: 3). 
10 For Slavoj Žižek, modernity, capital and secularisation have reduced religion to a ‘secondary 
epiphenomenon’ and a ‘lifestyle’ (Žižek, 2003: 3-7). ‘Culture’ (‘the new central life-world category’) and 
‘the name for all those things we practice without really believing in them’, is the last place, claims Žižek, 
to look for an authentic religious (Christian) legacy. 
11 The following image from Badiou’s Éloge de l’amour (2009a) illustrates how Badiou visualises 
universal singularity in its transition from the non-identarian to the universal: ‘Si, appuyé sur l’épaule de 
celle que j’aime, je vois, disons, la paix du soir sur un lieu montagnard […]; et que je sais, non pas son 
visage, mais dans le monde même tel qu’il est, et que celle que j’aime voit le même monde, et que cette 
identité fait partie du même monde, et que l’amour est justement, en ce moment même, le paradoxe d’une 
différence identique, alors l’amour existe, et promet d’exister encore. C’est qu’elle et moi, sommes 
incorporés à cet unique Sujet, le Sujet d’amour, qui traite le déploiement du monde à travers le prisme de 
notre différence, en sorte que ce monde advient, qu’il naît, au lieu de n’être que ce qui remplit mon regard 
personnel’ (28-29). 
12 ‘Personnellement, je me suis toujours intéressé aux questions de durée et de processus, et non pas 
seulement aux questions de commencement […]. L’énigme de la pensée de l’amour, c’est la question de 
cette durée qu’il accomplit’ (Badiou, 2009a: 33-34); see also Badiou on love in Saint Paul (Badiou, 1997: 
91-97).  
13 Badiou writes: ‘Les conditions de la philosophie sont transversales’ (Badiou, 1989: 13). By this Badiou 
means that philosophy is not defined by historical period but cuts across  all times frames and disciplines. 
14 Lyotard says that it is the task of literature and philosophy to find the idiom of the différend (Lyotard, 
1983: 30) 
15 For an analysis of the relation between confession, the subject and modernity, see Curtis’s article (Curtis, 
2003: 189-207). 
16 This is Lyotard’s language. 
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17 The theme of infancy is important in Lyotard’s definition of the encounter (event) and its value as 
initiation and as a ‘body’ before the ‘I’ of ‘adulthood’ is assumed (see Le Postmoderne expliqué aux 
enfants (1988) and Lectures d’enfance (1991).  
18 Throughout this article, I have stressed the significance of Badiou’s Paul in terms of disengaged 
engagement – that is, engagement being at the level of thought and not culture. Žižek’s Paul operates along 
the same lines; for Badiou’s ‘thought’ read Žižek’s ‘inner experience of the divine.’ 
19 See notes 3 and 8. Badiou also reinforces in a more direct way his critique of oblative love in Saint Paul: 
‘Paul n’est nullement un théoricien de l’amour oblatif, par quoi on s’oublierait soi-même dans la dilection 
de l’Autre. Ce faux amour, qui prétend que le sujet s’anéantit dans un rapport direct avec la transcendence 
de l’Autre, n’est que prétention narcissique’ (Badiou, 1997: 94). 
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